The common mantra in telecommunications 1 regulatory fora (be it national, regional or international) now goes along the lines of "deregulation -good; regulation -bad" and competition is said to be the ultimate answer to basically every question. Such a generalised dictum is in itself suspicious and even more so, when it refers to a sector such as telecommunications, which has a history of particularly heavy regulation and has been the very epitome of State intervention.
In the contemporary environment of vibrant communications, subscribing to a purely "black-or-white" approach may be, to put it mildly, unsafe. Before answering the question of the appropriate regulatory model for communications, it is essential to figure out what goals are to be pursued in order to consider what kind of measures could bring about their attainment. In the words of Robert Bork, " [o] nly when the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules". 2 Arguably, a brief look into the telecommunications-specific laws would suffice to identify the goals. Article 8 of the Framework Directive 3 of the current European Community (EC)
I. INTRODUCTION
As mentioned above, historically, the telecommunications sector has been particularly heavily regulated. While part of the rationale for the burdensome regulation was the natural monopoly characteristics of the industry, another (important) part was the different perception of the industry's role. Indeed, telecommunications have always been considered a "business affected with a public interest", 6 although the precise definition of the public interest has changed over time and even more impressively so, the measures for the achievement of the public interest goals. At the outset of their development, telecommunications were simply important for point-to-point communication within strictly national limits, and later, on a transnational level as well. In that context, governments regulated them as public services and took account of spectrum scarcity, national security and defence. Public authorities were given control of the national networks and the services provided through them. The entities responsible for telecommunications were organised as monopolies whose activities were exempt from the 4 Such a distinction is necessary since the objectives embodied in the legal regime may differ from the ultimate policy objectives. The first reason for this divergence is the constraints under which the institutions operate. The mandate of the regulatory agency is limited and clearly defined so that the agency can properly fulfil it. If broad discretion in implementation could be easily abused, for instance, it may be desirable to formulate the institution's tasks in terms of simplified rules. This might in practice lead to a loss of precision in implementation with respect to the ultimate objective, but could be far less damaging than leaving implementation of general objectives open to capture by particular interest groups or by the implementing agency itself. The second reason for divergence involves strategic interactions that may occur between the institution in charge and other agents concerned with the policy. The theory of delegation provides the important insight that a particular objective may be best achieved indirectly, by delegating responsibility for achieving it to an agent with a different objective. Finally, since a concrete legal regime corresponds to a certain period of application, the goals formulated in that regime might be focused on certain transitory problems that are peripheral to the ultimate policy objectives. See general rules of competition and subject to specific regulation. The objective of the regulation during this period, although not necessarily explicitly defined, was the provision of telecommunications services at affordable prices to the public and access to all citizens across the national territory to basic telecom services, which meant in essence, "a telephone in every home". 7 The telecommunications sector no longer fits the straitjacket of public service. Plain voice telephony service has been replaced with the idea of the Information Society 8 and the objectives of communications regulation have been adjusted accordingly. In the dynamic new world of electronic communications, the identification of the regulatory objectives is critically important and at the same time, increasingly difficult. Despite the possibility of finding ourselves between a rock and a hard place, we shall attempt to pinpoint some of the most relevant goals in the communications regulatory space.
Since electronic communications is a sector that touches upon, and indeed influences, multiple facets of economic and social reality, the goals to be pursued are equally varied. One could differentiate between economic and societal goals, although as we shall see below, these overlap in many respects. For the sake of clarity, this article will discuss the economic (Part One) and the societal objectives (Part Two) as distinct categories. Innovation and universal service will be examined as concrete models illustrating the complexity of the issues behind an economic and a societal goal of communications regulation.
II. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

A. Consumer Welfare
When one talks now about the economic objectives of regulation, as conventional wisdom has it, one is talking about competition (hence the above-mentioned mantra). The roots of the concept of competition can be traced back to the beginning of economic science: Adam Smith, the father of the "invisible hand" theory of welfare, viewed competition as the force driving economies to the best outcomes that are feasible. 9 Although the underlying economic theories of antitrust have changed over the years, 10 a competitive market driven by entrepreneurship is still 7 Colin R. Blackman, "Universal Service: Obligation or Opportunity?" (1995) Telecommunications Policy, 19:3, 171-176, at 171. 8 On the concept of Information Society, see infra Section 2.3. 9 Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, New York: Modern Library, 1937 (first published 1776). Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3300. The most well-known and cited passage therein is: "He [specifically each individual] generally, indeed neither intends to promote the public interest, not knows how much he is promoting it… [He] intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention". As cited by Patrick Van believed to make the most efficient use of resources and to be the best allocator of wealth among society's members.
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But competition is not an end in itself. It is the means for achieving the ultimate goal of economic policy, including the one applicable to communications, which is, according to modern economic theory, consumer welfare. 12 The consumer welfare approach sees competition as ensuring allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency in the economy. These three interdependent categories imply respectively that: (i) under the circumstances of allocative efficiency -firms employ resources and productive energies to produce goods and services that provide maximum benefit to society; (ii) under the circumstances of productive efficiencyfirms have the appropriate incentives to produce services at the lowest cost and production activities are distributed between firms so that industry-wide costs are minimised; and finally, (iii) under dynamic efficiency -firms have the appropriate incentives to invest, innovate, improve the range and quality of services, increase productivity and lower costs over time. Collectively, these generic benefits of competition provide maximisation of wealth at the lowest possible cost to society, the consumer 13 being the ultimate beneficiary of the competitive market forces.
The goal of regulation in the above context is to ensure that these efficiencies are present. In Western economies and, increasingly in all world economies, this is coordinated to a significant extent by the market mechanisms.
14 In fact, according to theoretical models, it can be demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, the allocation of resources by means of market 12 The surplus of a given consumer is taken to be the difference between the consumer's valuation of the good at issue (willingness to pay) and the price that he/she effectively has to pay for it. Consumer welfare (or consumer surplus) is then the combined surpluses of all consumers. The surplus of an individual producer, on the other hand, is the profit he/she makes by selling the good in question. Producer welfare (or surplus) is the sum of all profits made by producers in the industry. Economic welfare is a measure that aggregates both consumer welfare and producer welfare. In practice, it is sometimes difficult to see whether competition authorities favour, as an objective, consumer or total economic welfare. In the EC jurisdiction, as well as in the US, antitrust authorities and the courts seem to favour consumer welfare as the standard. 13 That is in a situation that we construe economic welfare as consumer welfare. However, even when we take it as a total surplus (id.), that is the sum of consumer and producer welfare, the consumers could be identified as the ultimate beneficiaries, since in most cases, producers are in effect consumers themselves.
14 The XXIX Report on Competition Policy states in that regard: "The first objective of competition policy is the maintenance of competitive markets. Competition policy serves as an instrument to encourage industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress and the flexibility to adjust to a changing environment". See European Commission, XXIX Report on Competition Policy, Brussels, 2000, at 6. See also Guidelines on vertical restraints, OJ C 291/1, 13 October 2000, [2001] 2 CMLR 1074, at para. 7. mechanisms is optimal.
15 Such conditions however seldom exist in reality and there is a demand for instruments for promoting efficiency and improving allocation. The public interest theory of regulation holds that government regulation can be the appropriate tool for overcoming the disadvantages of the market mechanism in situations such as imperfect competition, unstable market equilibrium, unbalanced market operation or undesirable market results. 16 Although this theory has been criticised because it takes for granted the effectiveness of the applied government regulatory tools and ignores phenomena, such as imperfect information and partiality of policy makers, 17 it remains true that some kind of regulation is needed where market failures occur.
The telecommunications industry is a vivid example of the changed views on economic regulation. The sector used to be heavily regulated precisely because it was believed that it constituted a natural monopoly, i.e. a case of imperfect competition, where due to the inherent high sunk costs, network effects, economies of scale and scope, it was more efficient (or so it seemed) to have only one operator on the market. 18 The enforced telecommunications regulation was meant to "correct" the undesirable effects and promote efficient allocation by certain restrictions on the market and on the organisation entitled with monopoly functions. This monopolistic view of telecommunications is no longer supported 19 and now it is the market itself that is responsible for bringing about the generic benefits of competition, as clearly exemplified by the current EC regulatory approach to electronic communications.
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B. Other Economic Objectives
While consumer welfare and the corresponding efficiencies are the core objective of economic regulation, it is often the case that economic policy is instrumentalised for the achievement of other objectives. 21 In the EC context, for instance, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated in its seminal Metro judgment that, "the requirements for the maintenance of workable competition may be reconciled with the safeguarding of 'objectives of different nature' 15 and that to this end certain restrictions on competition are permissible, provided that they are essential to the attainment of those objectives and that they do not result in elimination of competition for a substantial part of the Common Market". 22 Taking into account the macrodimension of the European project, these "objectives of different nature" are related above all to the promotion of market integration, 23 "involv[ing] the elimination of all obstacles to intra community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market".
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The internal market is a Community-specific goal that distinguishes EC law from its US (or other national 25 ) counterparts, where such an objective is absent. In the EC frame, when "[f]aced with a conflict between the narrow interests of a particular firm and the broader problem of integrating the market, the tendency [of the European institutions] will be to subordinate the former to the latter". 26 Although the realisation of the internal market (as a matter of regional integration) has its solid justification in economic theory, 27 the pursuit of other economic goals is questioned and criticised, in particular as far as application of antitrust is concerned. 28 It should however be noted that the underlying market integration rationale, which dominated EC competition law at the outset of its development, 29 has been increasingly eroded with the actual achievement of the single market. The generic benefits of competition, i.e. the purely economic rationale of competition for achieving efficiency, have gradually come to the fore. This "economic turn" 30 is to be seen together with a "public turn" towards formulation and pursuit of a multitude of policy objectives other than market integration. 23 Although it should be noted that, as the case law of the European Courts and the practice of the EC institutions have shown, the "objectives of different nature" in the sense of the Metro judgment, may also involve policy considerations other than market integration, such as the promotion of small and medium enterprises or diversity of market players. On these "other" goals, see e.g. Richard Whish, supra note 11, at 17-20; Massimo Motta, supra note 12, at 15-17, 26-30. 24 
C. Innovation As A Distinct Objective
In the context of the electronic communications industry and in accounting for its unique dynamism, it is perhaps worth placing additional stress on innovation 32 as a key objective among the economic goals of communications regulation. While innovation is undoubtedly important for the development of any sector of the economy, 33 it is particularly critical for electronic communications, which are driven by and highly dependent on innovative advances. 34 We suggest that in the communications environment, innovation has become an objective in itself and not necessarily, as a constituent element of other policy goals. 35 Taking a closer look at innovation will serve as a model to illustrate the complexity of issues behind any one of the economic goals of communications regulation and the subordinate regulatory decisions that need to be made in the specific environment of electronic communications.
Innovation is associated with one of the generic benefits of competition, namely the achievement of dynamic efficiency, under which firms have the appropriate incentives to improve the range and quality of their products and services, and to invest and innovate. It could further be linked to the general goal of governments of achieving sustainability.
36 If compared to the other static types of efficiency, dynamic efficiency could, in the long term, lead to the greatest improvement in social welfare. 37 Unfortunately, unlike other economic parameters (e.g. output or productivity), innovation is notoriously difficult to measure. 38 The economic theory itself expresses contradictory views on the relation between competition and innovation, ranging from the Schumpeterian hypotheses, 39 32 The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (6 th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) defines innovation as: (i) the introduction of new things, ideas or ways of doing something; (ii) a new idea, way of doing something, etc. A more politically loaded definition given by the organisation London Innovation reads: "Innovation is the successful exploitation of new ideas and is a vital ingredient for competitiveness, productivity and social gain within businesses and organisations". See http://www.london-innovation.org.uk. In the present paper, innovation will be understood as having its broadest meaning of research and development, invention and creation of new technologies, products and services (endogenous innovation), as well as the adoption of these by the relevant markets (exogenous innovation which stress the positive effects of market concentration and firm size on innovation 40 to the suggestion of X-inefficiency of monopolies and cartels leading to their "laziness" and "organisational slack". 41 Empirical research has proven none of these extremes true. Rather it "tends to suggest that neither monopolists nor fierce competitors have a superior track record in this respect, but it would seem clear that the assertion that only monopolists can innovate is incorrect". 42 The relation between regulation and innovation has an equally shaky foundation. 43 In general, regulation could affect the innovation of market players either through price regulations that would alter the industry profits and consequently, the stimulus to innovate, or through entry regulation that would influence innovation decisions regarding new entry. 44 In the electronic communications sector, however, some exogenous and (above all) endogenous factors could make the conventional conclusions questionable.
First and foremost, telecommunications bear the historical burden of monopoly. This means that in many markets, even now, after liberalisation, the incumbents are in a dominant or neardominant position and have, among other benefits, the "first-mover" advantage. 45 They could exploit this to enable them to invade new markets or "colonise" neighbouring ones with their own technology and/or standard. Due to the network effects 46 inherent to the industry, it might be hard for other firms to overcome this substantial advantage of incumbents, even if they possess a technology of higher quality.
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When considering the presence of network externalities in electronic communications in the present context of innovation, one also has to consider the scope of the network at issue. In network markets, the size of the network is of primary significance both for market players and for consumers in the process of making strategic decisions and choices. Networks become more valuable, the larger they are. Once they gain a certain critical mass, the owner of the network has the power to determine conditions and/or standards and because of the positive network effects, could grow even bigger, and consequently gain yet more power. 48 In the extreme, the winner takes all. 49 It is characteristic of network environments that the size of the network does not necessarily depend only on the quality and price of the services or products offered, which would normally convince consumers to make a certain choice, but also on the expectations about the size of the network. The larger the network, the more attractive it is and the more people are willing to join in. In the words of Shapiro [b] ecause of the specific features of network competition and the existence of network externalities which make it valuable for customers to have access to the largest network, MCI WorldCom's position can hardly be challenged once it has obtained a dominant position. The more its network grows, the less need it has to interconnect with competitors and the more they have to interconnect with the merged entity. Furthermore, the larger its network becomes, the greater is its ability to control a significant element of the costs of any new entrant…". 49 Another complication of networks and the development of the network markets is that the "winner-takes-all" scenario is logically related to a "loser-gets-nothing" situation. 55 This means that the bigger the network, the stronger the firm, and thus the poorer the chances for the survival of other smaller networks or firms. 56 This vicious cycle, from the viewpoint of the losers (and conversely, a virtuous one from the viewpoint of the winner), 57 influences the stimuli for innovation and predetermines the adoption of a new technology, service or product. Thus, firms, other than the dominant network owner, face extraordinary hurdles to surmount in network markets, which could seriously diminish their innovation potential. Firms could arguably improve their chances of survival, if their technologies are compatible with those of the larger network. This brings us to another issue of paramount importance in network industries in relation to innovation, that of standardisation and interoperability (or compatibility). 58 In fact, it has been proven that the trend towards standardisation 59 increases naturally 60 in the environment of networks.
Standards
Standards 61 are generally perceived as socially beneficial. 62 If applied to network markets, they allow, most notably, for the creation of networks of networks and make interconnections within them smooth. By enhancing interoperability, standards generate greater value for users by making the network larger. 63 Furthermore, standards could substantially reduce uncertainty for the consumers, as well for the other market players. Consumers' lock-in could be decreased and "the locus of competition [shifts] from an early battle for dominance to a later battle for market share. Instead of competing for the market, companies compete within the market, using the common standards". 64 Ultimately, "[a] perfectly compatible system of networks prevents static welfare losses which might otherwise arise due to lessened competition and dynamic welfare losses which stem from reduced innovative incentives".
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Standardisation as a process could be either market or regulation-driven. Under market conditions, there are generally a number of different strategies that firms 66 undertake in order to negotiate a standard or win a "standards war". 67 These involve inter alia important decisions on whether firms follow a revolutionary or an evolutionary technological path, whether they open their standard or maintain control of the technologies, whether they are diplomatic or aggressive, seek an alliance, settle for a truce or fight to the death. 68 Every one of these decisions could more or less dramatically change the market environment. What is of specific importance in our discussion of innovation and regulation is that these "standards wars" might not bring about the optimal result in terms of consumer welfare. Due to the specifics of networks, the market might settle for a standard that is not necessarily the "best" possible.
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In such situations, where the market chooses an inefficient standard, or is "locked-in" to an old standard, even in the face of a new, superior one, 70 there is a clear need for government intervention in order to promote standardisation or the migration to a new standard. 71 On the other hand, it should be noted that setting a standard or assisting the process of achieving one through regulatory intervention could equally lead to situations where a "wrong" standard 72 is 63 70 See Andreas Neumann, supra note 61, at 623-624. 71 " [I] t is important to note that regulating interoperability is essential for maintaining effective competition whenever there exists market power or a tendency for market dominance. For the markets in which there are no distortions due to market dominance or interface control, it might not be necessary to impose interoperability. Moreover, such control in these markets might have some important drawbacks in terms of innovation, as the operator who wishes to keep exclusive provision of its innovative services might be under an incentive to develop innovative and differentiated services". See Marc Bourreau & Pinar Doğan, supra note 34, at 174. 72 See e.g. Paul A. David, supra note 47, at 336.
chosen, or the natural market developments are seriously distorted. 73 The dangers of hard lobbying and regulatory capture are also real and present. In the context of electronic communications characterised by extreme dynamism and lack of predictability, making technologically biased choices could be particularly harmful to innovation incentives. 74 
Intellectual Property Rights: Some Brief Remarks
In talking about innovation and standardisation, we cannot ignore the issue of intellectual property rights (IPRs), although we shall confine our account to a few brief comments in the present context. 75 This is due to the particular scope of this article and, by no means, to any lack of significance of IPRs to the Information Society. 76 On the contrary, IPRs 77 do play a fundamental role with regard to innovation and creativity. 78 They are meant to be the tool for their protection and promotion, while simultaneously balancing other generally recognised interests. "The protection of intellectual property should allow the inventor or creator to derive a legitimate profit from his/her invention 73 Massimo Motta, supra note 12, at 484. or creation. It should also allow the widest possible dissemination of works, ideas and new knowhow. At the same time, it should not hamper freedom of expression, the free movement of information, or the protection of personal data, including on the Internet". 79 In the field of communications, where, as already stressed, the role of innovation is critical, the use of IPRs is intensified. The technological developments of the last couple of decades have "multiplied and diversified the vectors for creation, production and exploitation". 80 Digitisation and the proliferation of networks, in particular the Internet, have allowed for an unprecedented wave of innovation, which has led to calls for the protection of the newly created works. The liberalisation of communications markets, which has occurred worldwide over recent decades, has led to a multitude of market players and vigorous competition, which have completely changed the communications industries' landscape. These technological and market developments have serious implications, inter alia, for standardisation. "Now that telecommunication firms are competing nationally and internationally, IP rights are an important aspect of their arsenal, and as such now come to impinge on the standard setting process".
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Although both IPRs and standards are largely beneficial and have been created to serve the public interest, one should acknowledge that they pursue inherently different objectives and may thus collide. Standards, as discussed above, are by definition, common, widely recognised and used. IPRs, on the other hand, are exclusionary. Indeed, they could be construed as "minimonopolies", 82 allowing the owner of the "monopoly" control (albeit limited) 83 over the intellectual property object. This divergence should be kept in mind when we consider the "standards wars" and the "standards negotiations", discussed in the preceding Section, and their substantial impact on innovation. The presence of IPRs adds another level of complexity to these processes and allows for strategic games and configurations: "The fact that someone has exclusive rights of use concerning that essential technology allows for the potential restriction of the standardization process, or the corruption of it, undermining its role for the purpose of private pecuniary gain". 84 One should also acknowledge that the use of IPRs as strategic weapons in electronic communications is additionally aggravated by the fact that there are huge amounts of capital at stake. 85 To conclude this brief discussion of IPRs in the context of innovation as an objective of communications regulation, one can propose that there is a potential trade-off between the benefits of standardisation and the protection of intellectual property in a dynamic network environment. The regulators will clearly have to take these complex relationships into account. Answers to the "discussion of whether the existing intellectual property regime functions as intended -to stimulate innovation and thus promote long-run competition -or whether the system is out of balance, granting excessive intellectual property rights, and could be improved so as to avoid retarding innovation and/or harming consumers" 86 will have to be sought. network environment of electronic communications, the threshold for intellectual property protection might need to be higher than in traditional markets in order to foster the adoption of standardised interfaces and the realisation of network externalities. 87 On the other hand, intellectual property protection may be required in network markets in order to provide adequate rewards for firms pursuing research and development of better standards, rather than settling for the current ones. 
Facility-based Or Service-based Competition?
Another choice that has to be made in the framework of electronic communications of significance for defining the path of innovation, is between innovation for new services and innovation for new (alternative) infrastructure.
89 From a regulatory perspective, especially in the context of liberalisation, it was particularly important to determine which of these alternatives (services or infrastructure) would receive a regulatory impetus and which would be pursued as the ultimate goal.
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Facility-based competition or competition between networks 91 involves the building of alternative infrastructure or duplication of the infrastructure of the existing operator. This type of competition is perceived as contributing to long-term efficiency and spurring investment and innovation.
92 Consumers are not bound by the local network owned by a single operator, but have a choice not only of services but also of network provision. "The benefits from flexibility and innovation obtainable under this state of affairs exceed by far those achievable under facility-sharing settlements". 93 These benefits 94 are, however, only one side of the coin: building 87 Peter S. Menell, supra note 47, at 142, referring to Peter S. Menell, "Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software" (1987) Stanford Law Review, 39, 1329-1372. 88 Id. 89 The dilemma between facility-based and service-based competition is a complex one. new networks is an extremely costly and sometimes a risky undertaking. Firms face enormous sunk costs and have to confront (in most cases) the competition of the incumbent, who already has an installed base. Furthermore, building new facilities may be construed as a "wasteful duplication" 95 of infrastructure. Service-based competition, on the other hand, takes place, as the name indicates, only with regard to the services or service-packages, offered over the already existing networks. In order to provide these, operators need to have access 96 to the network of the incumbent. In essence, the new market players buy and resell incumbents' services, trying to make profits by offering discounts on the incumbent's retail tariffs and to attract customers by superior efficiency in marketing or billing. 97 The entrants are, however, not free to launch new services, unless in collaboration with the incumbent, since the incumbent controls the network.
A prominent example of policing service-based competition is the opening of the local loop. The "local loop", also known as the "last mile", signifies the connection, the last wires laid between the customer and local area exchange of the operator's network. 98 These local networks constitute bottlenecks in themselves and are particularly uneconomical to duplicate. 99 If firms were to build an alternative access network, this would require large traffic volumes to make up for the investment costs, which in residential networks might be non-existent. 100 On the other 95 Mats A. Bergman, supra note 89. 96 The current EC Access Directive defines access as "the making available of facilities and/or services, to another undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing electronic communications services. It covers inter alia: access to network elements and associated facilities, which may involve the connection of equipment, by fixed or non-fixed means (in particular this includes access to the local loop and to facilities and services necessary to provide services over the local loop), access to physical infrastructure including buildings, ducts and masts; access to relevant software systems including operational support systems, access to number translation or systems offering equivalent functionality, access to fixed and mobile networks, in particular for roaming, access to conditional access systems for digital television services; access to virtual network services". See hand, these last metres of wire are crucial for reaching the end-consumers of any communications services.
During the process of opening telecommunications markets, it was acknowledged that to promote competition in these local markets, an additional regulatory intervention was needed. Access to such networks was policed through the exercise of "unbundling". This is a regulatory approach that, in the EC context, means providing mandatory access to the metallic local loops of notified operators designated as having significant market power in the fixed public telephone network supply market. 101 As such, unbundling facilitates entry into the market as firms may join without having to incur the high sunk and fixed costs of providing their own networks. This increases the number of market players and the choice of services, allowing operators to build customer base and brand recognition. 102 Under benevolent supply conditions, the actors are then stimulated to invest in alternative network structures in the long term and move up the "investment ladder". 103 However, it should be noted that by making entry too "easy", unbundling might also undermine some incentives for building alternative networks. 104 Furthermore, the climbing of the "investment ladder" is not in itself an exercise, which should be taken for granted -stepping on to the ladder does not mean that one will automatically reach its top.
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In terms of innovation, unbundling as a service-based promoter is beneficial and stimulating for new entrants in the short and mid-term, although its actual application in terms of pricing and timing is controversial. 106 With regard to long-term competition, however, the incentives for innovation may well be diminished. 107 The incentives for the incumbent will be determined by the pre-and post-entry regulation.
108 Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that, "to the extent that service-based and facility-based entry are perceived as substitute strategies by the entrants, regulatory policies that are aimed at each one of them may exhibit conflicts".
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D. Interim Conclusion on the Economic Goals
In drawing a conclusion on the economic goals of communications regulation at this preliminary level of the discussion, one could propose that the intermediate objective of economic regulation is the creation of "…conditions for competition to exist and policing it to continue to exist". 110 The latter leads to the achievement of the ultimate goal, which is consumer welfare and maximisation of wealth at the lowest possible cost for society.
In the environment of electronic communications with pronounced network effects, to achieve welfare (particularly in the long term) also means that the regulatory tools would have the capability to address the dynamic aspects of competition, i.e. innovation. In the words of Bourreau and Doğan, "[t]o the extent that technological changes alter the organization of the industry, speed of innovation -particularly in new markets -should be reflected in any regulatory intervention. If regulatory authorities cannot respond fast enough to follow the rapid change of the market, many regulatory measures then become either inefficient or obsolete".
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As the examination of some issues relevant to innovation showed, innumerable factors come into play in the pursuit of this dynamic aspect of competition. The relationship between these factors is however equivocal and offers no clear answers as to what is right or wrong, although a tendency towards a facility-based approach is discernible. It is furthermore of primary importance to acknowledge that these economic objectives do not exist in isolation, but rather exist simultaneously in the system of electronic communications. Due to the network externalities and other specificities of the communications environment, any regulatory decision taken would have repercussions in various directions and these need to be interpreted with caution.
Following this line of reasoning, one could propose that the real goal of regulation is to achieve a balance within the system. This will involve, among others, choices between static and dynamic efficiencies, strict economic and internal market rationales, market-driven and regulation-supervised (or assisted) standardisation, intellectual property protection and openness, infrastructure-based and service-based competition. The delicate balancing act between these options, and not only the movements of the "invisible hand", 112 will then ultimately bring the welfare aspired to. 107 When "…the incumbent sets too low a rental price for its loops; […] the entrant adopts the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective. The distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption but also on the type (quality) of the new technology to be adopted". 
III. SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES
The distinction between economic and social objectives is in many respects only nominal since the economy is an inseparable part of the overall structure of society. It thus has a direct influence on all other societal systems. Following this line of reasoning, the economic objectives outlined in the first part of the article, have a clear social dimension because they seek an increase in welfare through allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency, deterring undesirable distribution of wealth and opportunity, and since the ultimate beneficiaries of the market outcomes are the members of society. 113 Yet, there are goals beyond those that may or may not be met without additional regulatory intervention. These wider policy goals are aimed more directly at serving the public interest and may be economic in nature (such as the equitable distribution of resources) or less tangible (relating to education, culture, pluralism and democracy) and stemming from the fundamental rights as safeguarded in all constitutional models. For the purpose of this article, such goals will be referred to as societal. 114 Meeting them may involve, most notably, a departure from optimal economic outcomes and ancillary regulatory intervention, implying certain network regulatory costs. It should, however, be stressed that the accomplishment of the economic goals is often an essential prerequisite for the pursuit of those beyond.
Without any claims of being exhaustive, the following sections attempt to delineate a few of the societal objectives that are of primary significance in electronic communications and that should be taken into account when designing a model of regulation. In contrast to the previous Sections on the economic goals of regulation, which are generally valid for the majority of the sectors of the economy (or at least for those that are network-bound), the next sections on the societal goals will be sector-specific and focus exclusively on the communications environment. This change of approach is needed since the communications sector, "unlike car industry or wheat markets", 115 has an additional special role within society as a platform of communication and distribution of information.
A. Universal Service
When talking about societal goals, the first one that comes to mind in the specific context of telecommunications is universal service. We shall briefly look into the institution of universal service as an interesting example revealing the dynamics of the goals pursued and the politics behind their formulation. Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest". See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 US 447 (1993), at 458 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
114 "Of or relating to the structure, organization, or functioning of society", as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary, 4 th ed., Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. 
The Roots of Universal Service Policies
The concept and practice of universal service have their roots in certain "notorious" developments in the US at the dawn of the 20 th century. 117 As the legend goes, it was Theodore Vail, the then Chairman of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), who convinced the government that a regulated monopoly with a universal service obligation was a better model to adopt than a system of traffic interexchange among competing networks. 118 Theodore Vail called for the creation of a single, common, uniform, nationwide, telecommunications network whose services would ultimately be available to all users at all locations. 119 The subsequent adoption of the Willis-Graham Act in 1921 marked the end of the competitive era in US telecom markets and by exempting telephone companies from the Sherman Act, opened the way to monopoly, which was supposed to cater for universal service provision. The 1934 Communications Act affirmed the subsidised universal penetration model. Although it made no explicit reference to universal service, it charged the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with the task of giving all US citizens a national and global telecommunications service, provided by AT&T at an affordable price.
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In the EC, as a supranational entity, the conceptualisation of universal service and the need to formulate a comprehensive policy in that respect came understandably much later than in the US, with the liberalisation endeavours in the telecom sector. Until then, in the existing landscape of strictly national monopolies, there was no necessity for such a policy at the European level. Universal service obligations (USOs) did exist but they were considered a national matter of the Member States. The pre-liberalisation Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) monopoly model had as one of its core objectives, and indeed as its justification, the provision of universal service as part of the public service. 121 It was widely assumed at the time that state ownership was sufficient to secure PTT action in the public interest. "[T]he state was seen as a 'stopgap' for tasks that the private sector could not provide" 122 and the PTTs were viewed accordingly "as instruments of government policy contributing to macroeconomic and microeconomic policy goals, including the provision of universal service". 123 In reality, most PTTs never came remotely close to providing universal service in the sense of access to the public telephone network to all at all locations. The levels of economic efficiency of the PTTs and their responsiveness to customer needs were poor, and in almost all respects, the "idealistic theory of public service failed dramatically in practice". 124 Similarly, even in the US, although the AT&T, provided through cross-subsidisation between long-distance and local call traffic, local telephony below cost, it did not achieve universal geographical rollout of its services. In fact, it took until the 1960s for appropriate levels of penetration to be reached due mostly to a reduction in connection costs faced by service providers and a vigorous market demand. 
Universal Service in a Post-Liberalisation Era
As mentioned earlier, the EC did not have a clear-cut universal service policy since the provision of the so-called public services was deemed a national matter until the beginning of the opening of telecommunications to competition. With the formulation of European telecommunications policy, however, which commenced symbolically with the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment 126 in 1987, the idea of providing certain "basic services" was taken into consideration. 127 Within the Open Network Provision (ONP) model, which provided for asymmetrical sectoral rules that assisted the liberalisation of EC telecommunications, 128 universal service was for the first time regulated at the Community level. It was founded on three major principles, namely: 1) Continuity, i.e. a specified quality must be offered all the time, 2) Equality, i.e. access must be offered independently of location, and 3) Affordability, i.e. a certain price level for basic services, affordable for all, must be assured. 123 Id. 124 William H. Melody, supra note 6, at 14. 125 Following these principles, Directive 97/33/EC 129 and Directive 98/10/EC, 130 identified "universal service" as "a defined minimum set of services of specified quality which is available to all users independent of their geographical location and, in the light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price". 131 This "minimum set of services" included at that time: (i) access to the fixed public telephone network at a fixed location; (ii) access to fixed public telephone services enabling users to make and receive national and international calls, supporting speech, facsimile and/or data communications; (iii) directory services; (iv) public pay phones; and (v) certain measures for disabled users and users with special social needs.
132
The 2002 EC universal service regime 133 includes in the USOs: (i) access location to the public telephone network; (ii) access to publicly available telephone services at a fixed location enabling end-users to make and receive local, national and international telephone calls, facsimile and data communications; (iii) directory services; (iv) public pay telephones; and (v) certain specific measures for disabled users, those with low income or special social needs.
If one compares the above two definitions, it is striking how little has changed. 134 The parameters of the USOs are practically the same and a legitimate question that arises, is: what has changed since the liberalisation? Has the introduction of competition changed anything?
We argue that, although seemingly little has been altered, a few key "ingredients" of the overall universal service policy certainly have: firstly, it appears that there is a new case for universal service. While, during the liberalisation period, some of the rationales for universal service provision were incited by the politics of transformation, rather than based on purely economic and social grounds (or to put it radically, in the words of Nicholas Garnham, the idea of universal access was "mobilised as an attempted defence of the telephone monopoly" use of communications services as a substitute for other services (e.g. transport) and the increasing value placed on communications in the Information Society -as providing access to other goods and services, including public ones -are some of the reasons for making a new case for universal service. 136 Secondly, in the new context of competitive communications, there are new tools for the provision of USOs. There is, above all, an emphasis on the role of the market in the achievement of the defined USOs. This priority role of the market takes different dimensions. In the EC context, for instance, Member States are obliged to "…determine the most efficient and appropriate approach for ensuring the implementation of universal service, whilst respecting the principles of objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality" 137 and to seek a minimisation of market distortions. 138 As a consequence of the above, no market player is a priori excluded from designation for provision of USOs 139 and all undertakings present on the communications markets are eligible under an efficient, objective, transparent and nondiscriminatory designation mechanism.
140 Furthermore, appointed operators must not necessarily be nationals of the Member State and undertakings from other geographical markets (e.g. US or Swiss companies) or other sectors (e.g. from the electricity industry 141 ) could enter the designation procedures.
A third element added to the post-liberalisation universal regime that is linked to the above, but may be also considered separately, is its built-in flexibility. For instance, EC Member States may now designate more than one undertaking, or designate different undertakings or sets of undertakings to provide different elements of the universal service and/or to cover different parts of the national territory. 142 This fragmentation of the mandate allows for competition between undertakings in the provision of universal service and greater efficiency. In view of the inherent dynamism of communications, the flexibility of the new regime is further ensured by the periodic review of the scope of USOs. 143 The review is to be undertaken "in the light of social, economic and technological developments, taking into account, inter alia, mobility and data rates in the light of the prevailing technologies used by the majority of subscribers". 144 The review process could thus, taking account of new developments in society, in terms of the need for and spread of technologies, and the new developments in technology, adjust the parameters of universal service at the EC level. 
Interim Conclusion on Universal Service
The insertion of the services, outlined in the above Section, as part of the current USOs is warranted by the importance of communication, inclusion and cohesion in a contemporary society. In that sense, the provision of communications services is "extended not just to the limit of economic efficiency, but to the limit of social need", 146 even if satisfying the latter deviates from the strict economic raison d'être. As stated by the First EC Communication on Services of General Interest, "[t]he real challenge is to ensure a smooth interplay between, on the one hand, the requirements of the single market and free competition in terms of free movement, economic performance and dynamism and, on the other, the general interest objectives". 147 In facing this challenge, the new universal service regime departs from the broad concept of public service (as something essentially provided by the State 148 ) and moves towards a flexible USOs system where the market delivers most of the benefits with some additional regulatory corrections made.
149
One should not however equate the universal service regimes (previous, current or future) to the societal goals behind USOs. 146 William H. Melody, supra note 6, at 13. 147 European Commission, Services of general interest in Europe, OJ C 281/3, 26 September 1996, at para. 19. 148 See supra note 121. 149 "The public service mission has not changed but it is not the undertakings with special or exclusive rights who are responsible for its execution. It is rather the market now who is to deliver most of the benefits with certain additional regulatory corrections made". See Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at para. 5.05. For a comparison between public service and universal service, see id. at paras. 5.318-5.324. 150 that, although the meaning of universal service and how it is pursued vary widely, there is "an underlying unity of aim". 153 Equity, continuity and affordability as values innate to citizenship 154 remain as its intact objectives (albeit pursued with different stress and intensity). Thus, one could conclude that universal service is a tool for the achievement of other societal goals. It is also a dynamic concept, "[b]y its nature […] prone to evolution", 155 and could accommodate, depending on the political environment, different concrete objectives. 156 Although until now, universal service has coincided in practice with plain old telephone service (POTS), we should think of it instead as an "empty" concept based on the principles of continuity, equity and affordability that may be filled in the future with additional content.
157 Following this line of reasoning, universal service could then be stretched to include broadband or other Internet applications (especially in view of the enhanced Information Society policies) or assigned entirely different task(s) related to access to information rather than simply dealing with conventional access to networks.
158 USOs could further be seen as a driver of innovation, 159 taking into consideration the aforementioned importance of innovation in itself and the specificities of communications as a network industry. 160 As such, universal service could "stimulate the creation of a broad-based society of lay users for advanced ICT [Information and Communication Technologies], whose participation in successful interaction with suppliers is key to the breadth of the ICT innovation process […] increas[ing] the total range and number of information technology innovations and at the same decreas[ing] the proportion of 'unsatisfactory innovations'". 161 153 Claire Milne, id. at 777. Claire Milne identifies the following common elements: (i) universal service is desired for social or political reasons and includes a notion of "equity"; (ii) achievement of universal service is apparently not commercially viable; (iii) it is recognised that definitions will change as society and technology change; (iv) definitions cover what are seen as "basic telecoms services" i.e. well established, relatively cheap, and very important to ordinary people; (v) adequate quality of service is defined or understood; (vi) service must be affordable by those for whom it is designed. 154 Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at para. 5.319. See also Giuliano Amato, "Citizenship and Public Services: Some General Reflections" in Mark Freedland & Silvana Sciarra (eds.), Public Services and Citizenship in European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 145 et seq. 155 Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, id. at para. 5.78. 156 For a critique of the possibility for pursuit of other political objectives, see e.g. Milton L. Mueller, supra note 150; Nicholas Garnham, supra note 125, 199-204. 157 See e.g. The Economist, "Hearing Voices", 28 October 2004. 158 Robin Mansell remarks in that regard: "There is a shift away from policy discussions about the access to networks towards debates about the availability and affordability of information applications. A distinction between "basic" access to networks at reasonable prices and "basic" access to information is needed. The issue is whether network operators and service suppliers who control the gateways for accessing customers should be permitted to screen out certain kinds of information that may be regarded by public policy as essential to the conduct of business and everyday life. Decisions are needed on whether provisions need to be made to ensure access to certain kinds of public information (e.g. health, education, transport, government information) and whether the governments of member states or the European Union should underwrite the costs of ensuring that this information is accessible". . 160 See supra Section 1.3. 161 François Bar & Annemarie Munk Riis, supra note 159, at 17.
B. Consumer protection
Consumer protection is another societal objective that one could clearly identify, both as a general concept valid for all economic sectors and as having a communications-specific meaning. Consumer protection is in fact a notion that covers a wide variety of policies ranging from very precise and exhaustive rules (e.g. contract conditions, labelling requirements, etc.) to more general ones (e.g. universal service policy). If we construe consumer protection in its broadest sense, all of the objectives outlined in the preceding Sections, namely competition in its static and dynamic aspects, universal service and all the policy choices made for their achievement -regarding liberalisation, innovation, standardisation or definition of USOsshould lead to protection of the consumers. Indeed consumers are intended to be the ultimate beneficiaries, both individually and collectively, as members of the socium.
As mentioned above, the achievement of the economic goals is often an essential basis for the pursuit of "other" goals. This, however, does not imply a primacy of the economic goals over the societal (non-economic) ones. The latter must be guaranteed in parallel, constantly and without compromise. The roots of the principle of consumer protection may be traced back to the constitutional human rights, in the sense of the right to the integrity of the person, 162 the right to liberty and security, 163 the right to property, 164 right to protection of personal data, 165 and to nondiscrimination, 166 among others.
167
Transparency, objectivity, proportionality and non-discrimination are additional general principles that permeate legal regimes and are equally valid for the regulatory framework for electronic communications, both for the service providers and the regulating agencies.
168
Timeliness and impartiality are further norms for the actions of the regulatory authorities. 169 So 162 European Convention on Human Rights, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364/1, 18 December 2000, at Article 3. 163 Id. at Article 6. 164 Id. at Article 17. 165 Id. at Article 8. 166 Id. are their competence 170 and independence. 171 Securing these essential principles of both commercial behaviour and good governance, as distinct rules and in their totality, ultimately guarantees the safeguarding of consumers' interests.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 172 contains a special provision addressing consumers' interests, which obliges the Union to ensure "a high level of consumer protection".
173
Article 153 of the EC Treaty is a concrete expression of this obligation 174 that gives a legal basis for the adoption of a comprehensive Community-wide consumer protection regime.
175
While it is clear that consumer protection has been recognised as a goal of regulation and is taken into consideration when designing, interpreting and applying the law, we argue that in the specific environment of electronic communications, the objective of protecting the consumer takes equally specific dimensions and calls for specific tools to address them. The examples below convey this idiosyncrasy and the complexity of the task of guaranteeing consumers protection in electronic communications.
Firstly, it should be recalled that the Framework Directive of the 2002 EC regime for electronic communications identifies, pursuant to Article 8, consumer protection as one of the major policy objectives 176 to be pursued by the NRAs, and thus in the implementation of the entire regime. 177 Reflecting our thoughts on the human rights basis of consumer protection, Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive construes it broadly and speaks of promoting "the interests of the citizens of the European Union" rather than merely those of the 'consumers', as defined in Article 2 of the Directive. 173 Article 38 of the Charter reads: "Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection". 174 Article 153 EC states notably at para. 1 that, "[i]n order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests". Para. 2 states further that consumer protection requirements must be taken into account in defining and implementing other Community policies and activities. 175 See Article 153(3) EC. See also all secondary legislation acts in force on consumer protection at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/repert/1520.htm. 176 The other two being the promotion of competition and the development of the internal market. See Article 8(2) and (3) of the Framework Directive.
177 Pursuant to Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive, the NRAs are to take all reasonable measures to promote the interests of the citizens by: (i) ensuring access to universal service; (ii) a high level of protection for consumers in their dealings with suppliers, in particular by ensuring the availability of simple and inexpensive dispute resolution procedures; (iii) a high level of protection of personal data and privacy; (iv) promoting the provision of clear information, in particular requiring transparency of tariffs and conditions, (v) addressing the needs of specific social groups, in particular disabled users; and (vi) ensuring that the integrity and security of public communications networks are maintained. The specific instruments that guarantee the achievement of these objectives are the Universal Service Directive and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, although all Specific Directives contain provisions on and considerations of consumer protection. See e.g. Recital 5, Articles 1 and 13 of the Access Directive, as well as Recital 7 and Article 11 of the Authorisation Directive. 178 The Framework Directive defines a consumer, for the purposes of the EC electronic communications regime, as "any natural person who uses or requests a publicly available electronic communications service for purposes which are outside his or her trade, business or profession". "User", on the other hand, is defined as "a legal entity or natural person using or requesting a publicly available electronic communications service". See Article 2(1), letters (h) and (i) of the Framework Directive.
Secondly, we should acknowledge one distinctive characteristic of consumer protection in e-communications that could be of primary importance when designing the concrete safeguard instruments. Namely, that it is a dynamic concept -both because of the transformed market environment of electronic communications resulting from the liberalisation of the sector and because of the rapidly changing technologies intrinsic to the "new" electronic communications.
With regard to the former point, as discussed above, the liberalisation of telecommunications also entailed their transformation from public services to normal commercial activities. Prior to this transformation, telecommunications services were provided by the public operators, which were organised as administrations and were often State-owned. Since the liberalisation, however, the relations between the provider and the consumers are no longer of an "administrative" nature (i.e. between the State and the citizens) but rather based on common commercial terms, i.e. upon contractual relationships. 179 This development, which tolerates greater commercial freedom, also calls for a higher level of protection and mechanisms put in place to ensure this. 180 Furthermore, liberalisation allowed new players to enter markets, which accordingly gave consumers the opportunity to choose between operators, service packages and/or networks. This freedom of choice was created and is largely guaranteed by the competitive processes in the markets. 181 In communications, however, due to some technical predeterminations, this freedom might be harmed and needs to be secured through additional regulation. Number portability and carrier selection and pre-selection rules 182 could be seen as expressions of this need.
183
The plurality of market players has a definite positive effect on consumer choice both in terms of more, better and innovative services and in terms of lower prices. 184 It could however also have negative repercussions that would require additional intervention in order to protect consumers. A pertinent example is the quality of the services offered. In that regard, under the 181 See Recital 26 of the Universal Service Directive. 182 The number of portability provisions ensure that all subscribers of publicly available telephone services, including mobile ones, can retain their numbers on request (not only for the sake of convenience but also because numbers could be of significant economic or social value), independently of the undertaking providing the service (Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive). Carrier selection and pre-selection rules, on the other hand, enable access through the network of the incumbent to other (than the incumbent) operators for the provision of connection to and use of the public telephone network at a fixed location. This access could be granted on a call-by-call basis by dialling a certain code or by means of pre-selection, i.e. with a facility that overrides the pre-selected choice on a call-by-call basis (Article 19(1) of the Universal Service Directive). 183 It should be pointed out that although both number portability and carrier selection and carrier pre-selection are viewed here as expressions of consumer protection, they have different legal nature. Pursuant to the Universal Service Directive, number portability is seen as an aspect of end-user rights, while carrier selection and pre-selection are forms of ex ante obligation that might be imposed on an undertaking with significant market power. 184 The Tenth Communications Report notes: "The pattern of increasing consumer benefits, in terms of lower prices, greater choice and more innovative services, that has been evident since e-communications markets were first liberalised, is continuing as a result of the more competitive environment and the flexibility provided by the new regulatory framework. This year [2004] has seen increased choice through the entry of new operators into the market and more options for broadband. As competitive pressure intensifies, prices have fallen in some segments". See supra note 103, at Summary, at 8 (footnotes omitted). This development has been confirmed by the Eleventh Communications Report, supra note 20, at 14. new post-liberalisation conditions, there may be an increased need for transparency and "access to comprehensive, comparable and user-friendly information".
185
Another possibly harmful consequence of the multiplicity of market players, which stems from the network nature of electronic communications, is the occurrence of negative network effects. Because of their very structure, if one node of the network breaks down or is congested, the negative effects spread across the whole system causing it to fail. This calls for measures to ensure the integrity of the network. 186 The security of networks is clearly also of significance as regards the data being carried over them. 187 The second dimension of the dynamic concept of consumer protection in electronic communications environments relates to the rapid technological advances in the communications sector itself. Sophisticated digital networks, the possibility of instant data transfer, the access of more and more people to these networks and their accordingly increased use for business and communication create a new reality and call for suitably up-to-date modes of protection.
188
Delicate issues related to privacy, such as location data 189 and the confidentiality of information, 190 have to be properly dealt with in an environment that is increasingly unpredictable and by its very nature is constantly evolving.
191
Assuring an appropriate level of consumer protection could feed back positively into the development of new technologies, particularly since the adoption of new technologies is dependent on consumers' expectations and characterised by network effects. Furthermore, on a more general level, "[t]he establishment of consumer confidence and trust are a prerequisite for 185 The Universal Service Directive prescribes a procedure, whereby undertakings are to publish "comparable, adequate and up-to-date information for end-users on the quality of their services", Article 22(1)). Pursuant to Article 22(2), NRAs may additionally specify "the quality of service parameters to be measured, and the content, form and manner of information to be published, in order to ensure that end-users have access to comprehensive, comparable and user-friendly information". See also Annex III of the Universal Service Directive and Article 4 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive. Generally, on quality of service, see Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford, supra note 96, at para. 7.11. 186 Article 23 of the Universal Service Directive. See also European Commission, On the review of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications and services, supra note 145, at 28-30.
187 "Security of networks and communications is a major area of concern for the development of the digital economy. Networks and information systems are now supporting services and carrying data of great value which can be vital to other critical infrastructures. Increased protection of the networks and information systems is therefore necessary against various types of attacks on their availability, authencity, integrity and confidentiality". consumer acceptance of, and participation in, the information society". 192 The latter may be particularly important for developing and fostering the new type of participatory culture. 193 To summarise the above paragraphs, one could submit that consumer protection in the environment of electronic communications is particularly demanding. Although, in principle, the market will cater for the interests of the consumers delivering the generic benefits of competition, a high degree of protection will necessitate decisions that run counter to the market forces, to safeguard consumers. In order to meet the objective of consumer protection properly, the regulatory instruments should form a multi-level, coordinated and flexible system that will be capable of addressing communications-specific situations and can adjust swiftly to new circumstances. The technological and market evolution of communications and their intensified inclusion in the modern personal and social lives may further warrant the formulation of new consumer protection sub-objectives in order to effectively safeguard the public interest.
C. On a Higher Level
Talking about communications and the goals of communications regulation, we should distance ourselves from the concrete parameters of the regulatory regime(s) and their increasing technical complexity in order to see the development of electronic communications from a broader perspective. Below, we attempt to outline some of the "higher" objectives that should be considered in electronic communications, in particular in view of the phenomena of digitisation, convergence and globalisation. One could equally interpret them as an elaboration of consumer protection in a "higher", human rights context. In this Section, communications are considered not only as "transmission systems", 194 but above all, in their special role as channels carrying and disseminating information and content.
As we already mentioned, the telecommunications sector has changed. The evolution of ecommunications and "the continuing development of new technologies for the transmission and storage of information [have led] to organisational, commercial, technical and legal innovations that are having a profound impact on society in general". 195 We should also note that, "[a]s the use of [information and communication technology] grows, so does its impact on society". 196 Thus, both the quantitative and the qualitative ICT-based ramifications for society are clearly immense.
If we look at the Information Society as a general societal phenomenon, it would be rather superficial (and largely untrue) to relate its creation and development solely to the advances in information and communication technologies. 197 We should also take into account the wider social, political and cultural processes that have led (and continue to lead) to the networked, knowledge-based environment that we are now living in.
have numerous repercussions and mostly notably in our context lead to increasing interconnectedness within the information networks. The emergence of all-encompassing global networks, on the other hand, underlines the significance of the flow of information, 212 i.e. the content that spreads through them.
Undoubtedly, the global reach and technological potency of these infrastructures have allowed for vast amounts of information to be disseminated. Especially now that digitisation has become ubiquitous, all types of content (audio, video or text) expressed in ones and zeros could be distributed over any network (telephone, cable or mobile) at the speed of light. New forms of communication are emerging (such as weblogs 213 and online social networking platforms 214 ) and together these developments have led to a fundamental shift in the traditional channels of distribution of content.
The means of distribution have accordingly changed the content being distributed. In the words of Jean Baudrillard, "there is more and more information, and less and less meaning". 215 The emergence of transnational communication conglomerates as key players in the global system of communication and information diffusion 216 has led to a simultaneous transformation of the type and variety of content being distributed. Formats and contents of TV programmes, films and shows have become increasingly homogeneous. 217 Although this globalisation and "uniformisation" of content do not necessarily (and automatically) mean a cultural desert, where diversity has perished and the rules are made by transnational corporations, 218 they do lead to the not to send, and to receive or not receive messages without any hindrance by any third party, while "access" signifies the possibility for individuals, groups and organisations to share society's communications resources. 225 Similarly, in the course of the preparatory work of the WSIS, there was an attempt to formulate a "right to communicate". The draft declaration on the "right to communicate" stressed the necessity for a new human right, partly embracing existing rights and partly composed of new ones, such as the right to access to technologies or the right of protection against cyber crimes and cyber terrorism.
226
Urs Gasser addresses the issues more comprehensively and suggests three core values as cornerstones of a regime. 227 The first is informational autonomy, which builds upon the theses of Yochai Benkler, 228 and is to be understood as encompassing three elements, namely the freedom to make choices among alternative sets of information, ideas and opinions; the right to express beliefs and opinions and finally, in a digital networked environment, the right of the user to participate in the creation of information, knowledge and entertainment. The second core democratic value is diversity in the sense of a wide variety of information from a great variety of competing sources. Gasser advocates that, "a diverse information environment in its current incarnation not only improves deliberation and decision-making processes. Rather, the diversity of information, knowledge, and entertainment is an important aspect of the broader concept of cultural diversity which has been recognized as a fundamental value of our societies". 229 Finally, as a third core value, he identifies high quality information, which is to be construed not only in its functional and cognitive aspects but also notably, in its aesthetic and ethical dimensions.
Despite the comprehensiveness of the latter approach and its arguably more adequate fit to the environment of contemporary communications, we hold that there is no need to formulate new rights to respond to the new modes of communication. It is, on the contrary, perhaps now more important than ever to affirm the innate human values. As stated in a key Background Note of the WSIS, "[t]he human rights standards developed on the basis of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitute a set of internationally adopted norms, relevant to all spheres of life, including the Information Society". 230 The established human rights are indeed flexible enough to capture all of the above situations, while also benefiting from the jurisprudence of the national, regional and international courts interpreting and applying these rights. Furthermore, taking a different perspective, one could say that what we are dealing with here, are above all regime collusions, 231 i.e. collusions between values inherent to different social systems, such as economy versus art. Since each social system is bound by its language, 232 communication may be facilitated if we use the "old" terms. Following this line of reasoning, while acknowledging the fact that, "[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated", 233 we could identify the right to freedom of opinion and expression as the most central 234 of these standards 235 in the realm of communications. 236 The freedom of expression is key as an individual right but also in its specific interpretation in the sense of pluralism, 237 particularly important in the contemporary media society. Human rights could be further viewed as guarantees and enablers of cultural diversity, 238 the protection of which is critical in light of the implications of the changed communications environment outlined above: "Freedom of expression, media pluralism, multilingualism, equal access to art and to scientific and technological knowledge, including in digital form, and the possibility for all cultures to have access to the means of expression and dissemination are the guarantees of cultural diversity". 239 The above covers only a tiny fraction of the complex and diverse issues emerging from the cultural aspects of the Information Society and their relation to human rights standards. 240 The purpose of this Section was not to provide an exhaustive commentary on the debate, but rather to show that there are indeed higher goals with immediate relevance to communications. We should acknowledge that infrastructure could influence the content being carried over it, or alter the transport environment in ways that have a considerable impact on the content and/or on the access to this content. Consequently, technical transformations (notably, digitisation) could have grave effects on the innate human values, such as freedom of expression and information and ultimately, cultural diversity and identity.
Considering the institutional aspect of human rights and not construing them simply as individual rights, 241 they need to be reflected both in the regulatory regime for electronic communications and in its implementation.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 242 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 243 the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 244 and in the EC context, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 245 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 246 entail obligations with regard to the protection of human rights. The EC has formulated also explicit provisions for the promotion of culture 247 and provides in the current regime for electronic communications that, "[n]ational regulatory authorities may contribute within their competencies to ensuring the implementation of policies aimed at the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as media pluralism". 248 It remains to be seen, however, how, in reality, these intangible values will be effectively protected against the sweeping technological and market developments in electronic communications, especially considering the existing fragmentation of legal instruments at the international level.
249
IV. CONCLUSION
A full account of the goals of regulation and in particular, of communications regulation, is not possible. To use the vivid comparison of Mel Kenny, any attempt at identifying the precise goals of regulation could be indeed similar to "nailing a jellyfish". 250 Our analysis, based on elements of the primary and secondary EC law, but seen from a broader perspective, although not exhaustive, clearly reveals the multiplicity and diversity of objectives that can be conceptualised in the regulatory environment of electronic communications. These range from the conventional pursuit of consumer welfare through universal service to some higher goals of specific importance in communications, such as protection of freedom of expression and cultural diversity.
It is important to acknowledge that these goals cannot be framed into a neat hierarchical system where the policy-makers and/or the regulatory agencies could order their tasks in such terms as "firstly deal with competition on the markets; secondly, with innovation; thirdly, with culture, etc." There is indeed a simultaneous "first priority" quality of all the objectives, both economic and societal, which renders the design of an adequate "toolbox" fairly intricate. Furthermore, one can observe intense positive and negative dependencies (trade-offs) between the different objectives in that they feed into each other's achievement (e.g. internal market promotion and standardisation), or conversely, one is accomplished to the detriment of another (e.g. intellectual property protection and standardisation). As the somewhat deeper analysis of innovation further proved, there are a number of factors stemming from the specificities of electronic communications that complicate the pursuit of a single goal. The example of universal service showed, however, that the policy goals can evolve and be filled with new substance. A possible conclusion to be drawn from the systematic examination of the objectives of communications regulation is that there are complex linkages between them that ultimately form a system of variable interdependence, where a specific objective may change in response to a particular change within the system, thereby influencing all other elements.
To reduce the abstractness of such a conclusion, we could refer to a real-life example, namely that of Digital Cinema Initiatives (DCI).
251 DCI is a joint project of the six major Hollywood motion picture studios (Disney, Fox, MGM, Paramount, Sony, Universal and Warner Brothers) inaugurated in March 2002 with the goal of developing a system specification for digital cinema.
252 DCI pursues the adoption of this digital cinema standard and assists its deployment in movie theatres. DCI could be construed as a lucid example of new technological 249 Christoph Beat Graber, supra note 216, at 113. 250 Mel Kenny, supra note 10, at 101. Mel Kenny makes the comparison in the context of the objectives of competition law and not in a general sense, as we take the liberty of doing here. 251 See http://www.dcimovies.com. 252 Digital cinema refers to the use of digital technology to distribute and produce films. Films could be distributed via hard drives, DVDs, satellite or other networks. The economic advantages of digital cinema are immense: production and distribution costs fall radically (e.g. Rick McCallum, a producer of Star Wars Episode II: Attack of the Clones, said that it cost USD 16,000 for 220 hours of digital tape where a comparable amount of film would have cost USD 1.8 million) and economies of scale and scope are manifest. developments (stemming from digitisation and convergence) and market developments (as an industry response to applying the technology and creating a new standard). Against the backdrop of our elaborations above, we could identify the DCI project as exhibiting strong network effects, but although it creates positive economies of scale and scope, it entails dangers of lock-ins to the developed standard. Competition between standards is seriously reduced and although the DCI specifications are arguably an open architecture, the question of access is a thorny one. Furthermore, one cannot help but notice the competition law issues since the standard is developed by the six major Hollywood studios, which hold the lion's share of the media market's pie. This concentration of market power along the entire value chain of production and distribution of content, including control over the distributing networks and the industry standard clearly endangers the "higher" goals of pluralism and diversity, as mentioned above. Furthermore, non-digitised content has no distribution channel in the DCI scheme.
Against the above example and reiterating our interim conclusions, we hold that there should be increased awareness of the multiple effects of every event and/or decision in the complex communications system. Above all, regulatory frameworks will have to achieve balance within the system 253 taking into consideration the unintended consequences of single actions. The pursuit of balance will further have to accommodate the dynamism of electronic communications. The objectives would thus have to be maintained, while balancing the flexibility to meet new situations against the certainty inherent to regulation. 254 In conclusion, one can submit that economic efficiency and public interest objectives form two fundamental and complementary sets against which the likely performance of markets should be judged and specific regulatory criteria developed. Identifying regulatory criteria in this way will allow any corresponding measures to be clearly targeted at meeting the defined objectives, thus minimising possible distortionary and secondary effects on the market. However, since communications are a system of technological, economic and social linkages that profoundly influences the way we live, an adequate regulatory framework should also be able to take account of and address the relevant higher objectives, taken in the broad context of social welfare.
